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FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNAL ANTI-CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE CORRUPTION PERCEPTION

ABSTRACT

The aim of the study was to assess the impact of public integrity indicators, which reflect individual aspects of internal anti-corruption compliance, on the corruption rate in European countries. This impact was assessed using the regression analysis method and ANOVA test to identify statistically significant relationships between the studied indicators and the corruption perception. The sample included 38 countries in the European region and countries associated with the European public governance space. The data source was the OECD Public Integrity Indicators (PII) database (2026) and the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) data of Transparency International (2026). Additionally, the impact of selected macroeconomic and financial indicators on the CPI was assessed using data from the World Bank World Development Indicators (2026). As a result, it was found that the Adequacy of Implementation Structures and Reporting indicator ($\beta = -0.3135$) had the most significant impact in the Operational Activities and Results group. For the Transparency and Public Communication group, Inclusiveness and Transparency of Inter-Institutional and Public Consultations ($\beta = -0.2530$) and Transparency of Lobbying Activities and Prevention of Undue Influence ($\beta = 0.2923$) had a statistically significant impact. In the Regulatory Support group, Disciplinary Framework for Civil Servants ($\beta = 0.4735$) has the strongest impact. The additional analysis showed that GDP per capita had a statistically significant positive effect on the CPI ($\beta = 0.0004$; $p < 0.0000$), while GDP growth, inflation, and government expenditure did not demonstrate statistically significant individual effects. The study proves that formal regulatory requirements without proper institutional implementation do not provide the expected effect. Therefore, the fight against corruption requires a transition from improving legislative provisions to strengthening real mechanisms of internal control and open dialogue with the public. The obtained results can be used to improve the effectiveness of government anti-corruption programmes, taking into account the identified factors that influence the reduction of corruption rates.

Keywords: anti-corruption compliance, public integrity, OECD Public Integrity Indicators, corruption, public communication, economic development, GDP per capita, financial indicators

JEL Classification: D73, H83, K42, M14

INTRODUCTION

Corruption is a serious problem in every part of the world: billions of people live in countries where corruption destroys lives and undermines human rights. This study is motivated by the aspiration to obtain new data on the impact of the characteristics of the public integrity system on the fight against this phenomenon. Most studies examine the impact of global socio-economic factors on the corruption rate, but this study assesses the impact of institutional and operational characteristics of anti-corruption compliance in the public sector.

In modern conditions, effective counteraction to corruption is a key prerequisite for good governance, accountability, and citizens' trust in state institutions (Melnik et al.,

2022; Kussainov et al., 2023). Anti-corruption mechanisms, ethical standards, and professional culture of employees form the basis of effective anti-corruption compliance in public administration (Alazzam et al., 2023; Borlini, 2024). Internal anti-corruption compliance in the public sector refers to internal systems and procedures that ensure compliance with anti-corruption legislation and ethical standards by state bodies, their officials, and employees (Amelicheva, 2021; Vozza, 2021). The effectiveness of the compliance system determines the effectiveness of monitoring corruption risks, controlling compliance with anti-corruption requirements, responding to violations, ensuring reporting, and coordinating corruption prevention activities (Jongen, 2021).

Corruption also has significant economic and financial consequences, affecting public resource allocation, investment, and expenditure efficiency. However, the joint role of institutional, macroeconomic and financial factors in explaining corruption perception remains insufficiently studied. This study addresses this gap by examining OECD Public Integrity Indicators alongside selected economic and financial indicators.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Increasing the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts is the subject of numerous studies, which proves the relevance of the research problem in different parts of the world. Mahmud et al. (2022) and Yap et al. (2022) analysed the causes of corruption and preventive measures — both internal and external strategies. However, the first study is too generalized, as it is a literature review, which does not allow drawing conclusions about the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in specific conditions. In contrast, the second study focuses on the example of Malaysia, which enables taking into account the influence of contextual factors on the forms of manifestation and mechanisms for curbing corruption. This approach emphasizes the importance of local analysis, which is also confirmed in other studies. Ceschel et al. (2022) noted that the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures varies depending on the corruption rate in the country. Moss & Buachoom (2026) expand on this idea, noting that the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures significantly depends on the political and institutional environment in the country. However, the researchers' conclusions are based on the generalization of the results of earlier studies; therefore, they require critical reassessment taking into account current economic trends.

Cherniei et al. (2022) and Zhytkova et al. (2025) used the example of Ukraine as a country with a high level of corruption and revealed the causes and consequences of corruption, and also provided a number of recommendations for reducing the corruption rate. The recommendations include the need to increase trust in the authorities, optimize legislation, and improve coordination of law enforcement agencies. Makovoz & Koval (2023) and Nezhyva et al. (2024), also focusing on Ukraine, noted the importance of anti-corruption compliance programmes to mitigate corruption risks. However, the conclusions of the authors of the aforementioned studies are purely theoretical and do not allow us to assess the actual effectiveness of such programmes.

Internal compliance is increasingly considered in modern studies as an important element of combating corruption (Viol & de Mattos Pimenta, 2025; Shidqi, F., & Arfiansyah, 2025). Dubynskyy et al. (2024) and Kotukov et al. (2023) showed that anti-corruption compliance reduces the risks associated with corruption offences. Moreira & Soares (2023) investigated how anti-corruption compliance can be used as a tool to combat human rights violations. At the same time, a number of studies have expressed reservations about the declarative nature of individual compliance procedures, which does not lead to the expected positive result in practice (Topchii et al., 2022; Moscariello et al., 2024).

The economic and financial consequences of corruption have also been examined in recent studies. Spyromitros & Panagiotidis found that corruption negatively affects economic growth, while investment and institutional quality are important determinants of economic performance (Spyromitros & Panagiotidis, 2022). Farinha & López-de-Foronda showed that corruption in the European Union can restrict investment and financing, increase the cost of capital, and reduce the efficiency of public spending (Farinha & López-de-Foronda, 2024). Amin & Soh demonstrated that corruption has a stronger negative effect on employment growth among financially constrained firms (Amin & Soh, 2022). These findings indicate that corruption affects not only institutional quality but also economic growth, investment, financing, and the efficiency of financial resources.

Some studies focus on various anti-corruption mechanisms or areas for reducing corruption, which indicates the existence of many approaches to combating corruption (Barafi et al., 2022; Guo, 2023). Sarjito (2023) and Ginanjar & Purnama (2023) emphasize the need for a comprehensive approach that takes into account the local characteristics of specific countries. Sakuntala et al. (2024) and Ayibam (2025), also noting the need for comprehensive solutions in the fight against corruption, noted the need to take into account legal, ethical, institutional, informational, and technological aspects. Boufounou et al. (2024) empirically confirmed that compliance with legislation is one of the key factors in combating corruption. However, the researchers' conclusions are based on survey results, so the results of the study may be subject

to a certain degree of subjectivity. Le et al. (2021) analysed whether the use of internal control systems and codes of conduct in firms reduces the number of cases of violation of the law and bribery of public officials. However, the direction of the study deviates somewhat from the topic of this study, as the object of the study was company employees, and not officials responsible for preventing corruption. Chen & Ganapati (2023) analysed the impact of legal transparency mechanisms, as well as fiscal and electronic transparency, on curbing corruption. However, the study did not focus on the analysis of the impact of the functional effectiveness of individuals on preventing corruption, which narrows the understanding of the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms in practice. Dewantara et al. (2021) showed the importance of anti-corruption education as character formation that emphasizes free will and individual behaviour through the students' potential. This study shows the importance of individual factors in the fight against corruption, which correlates with the approach chosen in this study. However, the study results are based on theoretical assumptions and are not supported by practical evidence of effectiveness.

The review of earlier studies showed, on the one hand, the importance of research on combating corruption, and on the other hand, the insufficient development of the chosen topic. In particular, there is a lack of empirical work that would assess the real impact of internal anti-corruption compliance in the public sector on corruption perception. This study seeks to fill this gap by quantitatively analysing the impact of public integrity indicators on corruption perception. Particular attention is paid to the Operational Activities and Results group of indicators, which to the greatest extent reflects the practical implementation of the functions of internal anti-corruption compliance. The empirical study was conducted on a sample of European countries for which OECD Public Integrity Indicators (PII) and Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) data are available. This approach assesses the extent to which individual characteristics of the public integrity system and internal anti-corruption compliance are related to corruption perception.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The main hypothesis of the study is the assumption of the existence of an influence of the public integrity indicators on the corruption perception. The aim of the study was to assess the influence of public integrity indicators, which reflect individual aspects of the internal anti-corruption compliance, on the corruption rate in European countries, as well as to determine the role of selected economic and financial indicators in explaining differences in corruption perception. The study sets the following research objectives:

1. Assess the influence of the indicators of the Operational Activities and Results group on corruption perception using a linear regression model as characteristics of the compliance system.
2. Analyse the influence of the indicators of the Transparency and Public Communication group on the perception of corruption using linear regression models as indicators of the transparency of compliance mechanisms.
3. Investigate the impact of indicators of the Regulatory Support and Preventive Mechanisms and Integrity Groups on the perception of corruption using linear regression models as components of the regulatory and preventive block of compliance.
4. Assess the influence of selected economic and financial indicators, including GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation, and government expenditure, on the perception of corruption using a linear regression model.

METHODS

The study examines the effectiveness of internal anti-corruption compliance in the public sector through public integrity indicators that characterize the institutional and operational environment for implementing compliance. These indicators are presented in the study in terms of four groups: Regulatory Support, Preventive Mechanisms and Integrity, Operational Activities and Results, as well as Transparency and Public Communication. The Operational Activities and Results group of indicators reflects the practical functioning of internal anti-corruption compliance mechanisms. Other groups characterize the regulatory, organizational and institutional conditions for anti-corruption compliance, which directly affect its effectiveness by creating a favourable (or vice versa) environment for development.

In this study, internal anti-corruption compliance is understood as a system of internal organisational mechanisms for preventing, detecting and responding to corruption risks in public sector organisations. Its subjects include management, authorised anti-corruption officers and integrity units, internal control and audit functions, and other responsible officials. The OECD Public Integrity Indicators are used as proxies for the institutional and functional characteristics of this system. In Ukraine, the institutional basis for such mechanisms is established by the Law of Ukraine "On Prevention of Corruption",

which regulates anti-corruption programmes, corruption risk management and authorised anti-corruption functions (Articles 13-1 and 62–63).

The CPI is a country-level indicator of perceived public-sector corruption and is not a direct measure of the perceptions of individual compliance actors or citizens. Therefore, this study examines the statistical relationship between internal anti-corruption compliance characteristics and country-level corruption perception rather than assuming a direct causal effect on individual perceptions. In other words, the analysis examines whether stronger implementation of internal anti-corruption compliance mechanisms is associated with more favourable corruption perception outcomes at the country level.

The sample of countries for the study included 38 countries in the European region and countries associated with the European public governance space, for which OECD PII (2026) and Transparency International (2026) data were available. This provides sufficient institutional comparability for conducting regression analysis. At the same time, the sample is characterized by a significant variation in CPI values, as shown in the example of 2025 (Figure 1). This provides sufficient variability of the dependent variable and creates the prerequisites for identifying a statistically significant impact of public integrity indicators on the corruption perception.




Figure 1. CPI for the sample of studied countries in 2025. (Source: Transparency International (2026))

The study used a cross-sectional regression analysis model based on averaged country-level indicators for 2020-2025, which are publicly available at Transparency International (2026) and OECD PII (2026). The sample of indicators included the CPI and individual public integrity indicators, the list of which was formed in accordance with the objectives of the study. The CPI ranks 182 countries and territories of the world by the perceived corruption in the public sector. The results are presented on a scale from 0 (high level of corruption) to 100 (minimum manifestations of corruption). The OECD PII set a benchmark for government resilience to corruption risks and provide recommendations for strengthening integrity in public administration. These indicators cover the following areas: the quality of the strategic framework for combating corruption, accountability in policy-making, and the effectiveness of internal controls and risk management. Table 1 contains the public integrity indicators used in the study.

So, the OECD PII were selected for the empirical analysis. They were grouped by areas of regulatory support, preventive integrity mechanisms, operational activities, and transparency of public administration. The choice of these indicators is determined by the availability of complete and comparable data for all 38 countries in the sample. These indicators are also relevant for assessing the effectiveness of integrity mechanisms and corruption prevention in the public sector. In particular, these indicators enable making assumptions about the effectiveness of anti-corruption compliance indirectly through institutional conditions, control, monitoring, reporting, and integrity risk management mechanisms.

Table 1. OECD PII used in the study. (Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators (2026))

	OECD Indicator	Description	Link to functional effectiveness of authorized persons
	Economic and financial indicators		
Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kosovo*, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom.	GDP per capita	Gross domestic product per capita, reflecting the average level of economic output and economic development	Characterizes the level of economic development and its potential relationship with the corruption perception
	GDP growth, %	Annual percentage growth rate of GDP	Reflects the dynamics of economic activity and allows assessing its relationship with the corruption perception
	Inflation, %	Annual percentage change in the general price level	Characterizes price stability and the macroeconomic environment potentially associated with corruption perception
	Government expenditure, % of GDP	General government expenditure as a percentage of GDP	Reflects the scale of public financial resources and the efficiency environment of public expenditure
	OECD PII		
	1. Regulatory Support		
	Regulatory framework for access to information and open data	Regulatory and legal support for access to information and open data	Creates a legal basis for the work of authorized persons through access to data
	Regulatory framework for transparency in lobbying, conflict-of-interest and political finance	Regulatory and legal support for transparency of lobbying, conflict of interest regulation, and financing of political activities	Identifies key control areas for authorized persons; directly shapes their functional mandate in preventing conflicts of interest
	Regulatory framework for judicial integrity	Regulatory and legal principles for ensuring the integrity of the judiciary	Indirectly affects: expands the institutional environment in which authorized persons work
	Regulatory framework for prosecutorial integrity	Regulatory and legal principles for ensuring the integrity of the prosecutor's office	Strengthens inter-institutional interaction and defines the boundaries of response to violations
	Disciplinary framework for civil servants	Legal regulation of disciplinary liability of civil servants	Key tool for effectiveness: defines real mechanisms for the influence of authorized persons on violators
	2. Preventive Mechanisms and Integrity		
	Use of conflict-of-interest prevention mechanisms for senior officials	Practical application of mechanisms for preventing conflicts of interest in relation to high-ranking officials	Directly reflects operational efficiency: ability to detect, prevent and document conflicts of interest
	Anti-corruption and integrity safeguards for judges in practice	Practical implementation of mechanisms for ensuring integrity and preventing corruption among judges	Identifies external constraints on efficiency: are authorized persons able to ensure compliance with the provisions in practice
	Anti-corruption and integrity safeguards for public prosecutors in practice	Practical implementation of mechanisms for ensuring integrity and preventing corruption among prosecutors	Impacts on the effectiveness of response, speed and efficiency of processing anti-corruption cases
	Integrity safeguards for the application of disciplinary frameworks for civil servants in practice	Practical ensuring integrity during the application of disciplinary procedures for civil servants	Direct indicator of the effectiveness of the implementation of the control and accountability function
	Whistleblower protection within the justice system in practice	Practical effectiveness of whistleblower protection in the justice system	Enhances the input of information to authorized persons; critical for detecting violations
	3. Operational Activities and Results		
	Evidence-based problem analysis and use of diagnostic tools	Using evidence-based analysis and diagnostic tools to shape integrity policies	Reflects the analytical capacity of authorized persons: use of data for decision-making
	Adequacy of implementation structures and reporting	Capacity of institutional structures to implement integrity policies and report on results	Determines organizational effectiveness: do authorized persons have sufficient resources and accountability
	Coverage of basic functions to implement access to information and open data	Ensuring the basic functions of implementing access to information and open data	Indicates the operational capacity to perform basic anti-corruption functions
	Use of oversight and prevention mechanisms for financing of political parties and election campaigns	Practical application of mechanisms for controlling and preventing violations in party and election campaign financing	Reflects the level of involvement of authorized persons in complex financial anti-corruption loops
	4. Transparency and Public Communication		
	Inclusiveness and transparency of inter-institutional and public consultations	Openness and inclusiveness of inter-agency and public consultations	Demonstrates communication effectiveness: interaction with other institutions and society
	Transparency of evaluation practices and use in decision making	Transparency of policy evaluations and use of evaluation results in decision-making	Demonstrates the ability to use analytics and assessment results in compliance work
	Openness of government decision-making process	Openness of government decision-making	Creates an environment in which authorized persons can exercise control over decisions
	Transparency of lobbying activities and prevention of undue influence	Transparency of lobbying activities and prevention of undue influence	Key operational direction of anti-corruption authorized persons
	Proactive disclosure of datasets	Proactive disclosure of datasets	Reduces information barriers for monitoring and control
	Public availability of data	Actual availability of public data to users	Basic condition for effectiveness: provides the possibility of independent verification and analysis

The paper uses the regression analysis to describe the strength and direction of the relationship between indicators and the extent to which the variation of some variables explains the change in others. Regression analysis was carried out using Formula 1:

$$Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1t} + \beta_2 X_{2t} + \dots + \beta_k X_{kt} + \varepsilon_t, \quad (1)$$

where Y_t – dependent variable; $X_{1t}, X_{2t}, \dots, X_{kt}$ – independent variables; β_0 – constant; β_k – regression coefficients; ε_t – random error.

The overall significance of the constructed models was checked by applying the ANOVA test. The F-test (Fisher's exact test) was calculated by using Formula (2):

$$F = \frac{MSR}{MSE} = \frac{SSR/k}{SSE/(n-k-1)}, \quad (2)$$

where SSR – regression sum of squares; SSE – sum of squares of residuals; k – number of independent variables; n – sample size.

Based on the modelling results, four separate multivariate regression models were constructed – one for each of the four areas (groups of indicators) identified in Table 1. This gave grounds to assess the cumulative impact of each area's indicators on the CPI and identify the most significant determinants within each functional block. Additionally, a separate regression model was constructed to assess the impact of selected economic and financial indicators on the CPI, including GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation and government expenditure.

Calculations for analysis were performed in Excel using built-in functions and the specialized StatPlus add-in.

RESULTS

In the context of the study, special attention was paid to the Operational Activities and Results group of indicators. This group includes indicators that most closely reflect the functional aspect of the activities of authorized persons for the prevention of corruption. These indicators characterize the ability of public sector bodies to monitor corruption risks, use analytical and diagnostic tools, ensure the proper functioning of internal control mechanisms, etc. Therefore, these indicators can be considered as proxy indicators of the effectiveness of internal anti-corruption compliance and the functional efficiency of authorized persons for the prevention of corruption.

Table 2. Results of regression analysis of the impact of the Operational Activities and Results group indicators on the CPI. (Source: calculated by the authors based on Transparency International (2026) and OECD Public Integrity Indicators (2026))

	Coef.	St. error	LCL	UCL	t-stat.	p	H0 (5%)	VIF
Y-intercept	71.2513	7.0913	56.8067	85.6959	10.0476	0.0000	rejected	
Evidence-based problem analysis and use of diagnostic tools	0.0132	0.1246	-0.2406	0.2670	0.1060	0.9163	accepted	2.1091
Adequacy of implementation structures and reporting	-0.3135	0.1015	-0.5202	-0.1068	-3.0889	0.0041	rejected	2.0075
Coverage of basic functions to implement access to information and open data	-0.1302	0.0845	-0.3022	0.0418	-1.5418	0.1330	accepted	1.1683
Use of oversight and prevention mechanisms for financing of political parties and election campaigns	0.1341	0.0970	-0.0635	0.3317	1.3823	0.1765	accepted	1.1871

According to Table 2, the only statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) indicator of the impact on the corruption perception from the Operational Activities and Results group is the indicator Adequacy of Implementation Structures and Reporting ($\beta = -0.3135$). The relationship in this case is inverse, indicating that within the studied sample, higher scores on this indicator correlate with lower CPI values. Such a result may indicate a discrepancy between the formal implementation of institutional structures and their real ability to restrain corruption. The revealed dependence does not necessarily demonstrate a cause-and-effect relationship. However, it emphasizes the existence of a risk that strengthening the formal quality of reporting procedures does not automatically convert into improving the practical results of combating corruption. So, the

emergence of new tools is effective only when deviations from integrity are adequately detected, timely brought to the attention of responsible persons, and promptly corrected. Table 3 presents the results for the Transparency and Public Communication group.

Table 3. Results of regression analysis of the impact of the Transparency and Public Communication group indicators on the CPI. (Source: calculated by the authors based on Transparency International (2026) and OECD Public Integrity Indicators (2026))

	Coef.	St. error	LCL	UCL	t-stat.	p	H0 (5%)	VIF
Y-(intercept)	67.7311	13.0318	40.7728	94.6895	5.1974	0.0000	rejected	
Inclusiveness and transparency of inter-institutional and public consultations	-0.2530	0.0662	-0.3900	-0.1161	-3.8214	0.0009	rejected	1.2554
Transparency of evaluation practices and use in decision-making	-0.0052	0.0573	-0.1237	0.1134	-0.0900	0.9290	accepted	1.1634
Openness of government decision-making process	0.0506	0.1012	-0.1586	0.2599	0.5005	0.6214	accepted	1.3593
Transparency of lobbying activities and prevention of undue influence	0.2923	0.0827	0.1213	0.4633	3.5363	0.0018	rejected	1.3099
Proactive disclosure of datasets	-0.1400	0.2230	-0.6013	0.3213	-0.6277	0.5364	accepted	1.4748
Public availability of data	-0.0003	0.0909	-0.1883	0.1876	-0.0037	0.9971	accepted	1.2614

According to Table 3, two indicators have a statistically significant impact on the CPI: Inclusiveness and Transparency of Inter-Institutional and Public Consultations (negative impact $\beta = -0.2530$) and Transparency of Lobbying Activities and Prevention of Undue Influence (direct impact $\beta = 0.2923$). On these grounds, we can conclude that lobbying control and prevention of indirect influence enhance trust in the system and are associated with higher integrity. At the same time, a negative sign in the regression coefficient for the inclusiveness and transparency indicator may indicate formal inclusiveness of consultations, which is not transformed into real influence on decisions. Table 4 shows the impact of indicators in the Regulatory Support group.

Table 4. Results of regression analysis of the impact of the Regulatory Support group indicators on the CPI. (Source: calculated by the authors based on Transparency International (2026) and OECD Public Integrity Indicators (2026))

	Coef.	St. error	LCL	UCL	t-stat.	p	H0 (5%)	VIF
Y-intercept	84.8713	23.7130	35.8173	133.9254	3.5791	0.0016	rejected	
Regulatory framework for access to information and open data	-0.1607	0.2741	-0.7277	0.4063	-0.5864	0.5633	accepted	1.3983
Regulatory framework for transparency in lobbying, conflict-of-interest and political finance	-0.3288	0.1942	-0.7305	0.0728	-1.6935	0.1039	accepted	1.2912
Regulatory framework for judicial integrity	-0.2931	0.2999	-0.9134	0.3273	-0.9773	0.3386	accepted	4.7475
Regulatory framework for prosecutorial integrity	0.0157	0.3016	-0.6082	0.6396	0.0521	0.9589	accepted	3.7838
Disciplinary framework for civil servants	0.4735	0.1892	0.0821	0.8649	2.5028	0.0199	rejected	1.3613

The strongest and most statistically significant influence compared to other indicators in this group is exerted by the Disciplinary Framework for Civil Servants indicator ($\beta = 0.4735$). Accordingly, the formal consolidation of regulatory requirements in itself does not have a significant impact on compliance. Instead, its element, which has a real impact through sanctions, may have a positive effect. Table 5 presents the modelling results for the last group – Preventive Mechanisms and Integrity.

Table 5. Results of regression analysis of the impact of the Preventive Mechanisms and Integrity group indicators on the CPI. (Source: calculated by the authors based on Transparency International (2026) and OECD Public Integrity Indicators (2026))

	Coef.	St. error	LCL	UCL	t-stat.	p	H0 (5%)	VIF
Y-intercept	70.9211	14.0987	41.7556	100.0865	5.0303	0.0000	rejected	
Use of conflict-of-interest prevention mechanisms for senior officials	-0.1178	0.1288	-0.3842	0.1485	-0.9150	0.3697	accepted	1.0203
Anti-corruption and integrity safeguards for judges in practice	-0.0162	0.2044	-0.4391	0.4067	-0.0792	0.9376	accepted	1.6626
Anti-corruption and integrity safeguards for public prosecutors in practice	-0.1175	0.2681	-0.6720	0.4371	-0.4382	0.6653	accepted	2.0678
Integrity safeguards for the application of disciplinary frameworks for civil servants in practice	0.0770	0.1287	-0.1892	0.3432	0.5985	0.5553	accepted	1.1933
Whistleblower protection within the justice system in practice	0.0092	0.1274	-0.2542	0.2727	0.0726	0.9428	accepted	1.4668

Table 5 shows no statistically significant relationship between preventive mechanisms and an increase in the CPI. This may indicate the need to increase the effectiveness of such mechanisms in practice and improve their institutional implementation. Summarizing the obtained results, it can be assumed that transparency and communication have the greatest systemic effect on the perception of corruption. In turn, operational activities are a key element for the functional efficiency of authorized persons for corruption prevention, forming the core of compliance. Regulatory support has a limited impact, and preventive mechanisms did not show a significant effect on the phenomenon under study.

In addition to the OECD Public Integrity Indicators (PII) used in the above regression models, an analysis of the impact of general economic and financial indicators on the CPI was conducted. This approach allows us to distinguish the impact of institutional characteristics of public integrity and the broader macroeconomic environment. The additional model includes economic and financial indicators that characterize the level of economic development, the dynamics of economic activity, price stability, and public finances. The results of the regression model estimation are presented in Table 6.

Table 6. Results of regression analysis of the impact of macroeconomic and financial indicators on the CPI. (Source: calculated by the authors based on Transparency International (2026) and World Bank World Development Indicators (2026))

	Coef.	St. error	LCL	UCL	t-stat.	p	H0 (5%)	VIF
Y-intercept	32,6747	13,5445	5,1183	60,2311	2,4124	0,0216	rejected	
GDP per capita, USD avg	0,0004	5,6517E-5	0,0003	0,0005	7,1840	0,0000	rejected	1,1433
GDP growth, % avg	-0,6075	1,5384	-3,7373	2,5223	-0,3949	0,6955	accepted	1,6858
Inflation, % avg	-0,4028	0,3453	-1,1053	0,2996	-1,1668	0,2517	accepted	1,2701
Gov. expenditure, % GDP avg	0,3197	0,2487	-0,1863	0,8257	1,2853	0,2076	accepted	1,7436

The results of the regression analysis indicate a statistically significant positive impact of the GDP per capita indicator on the level of corruption perception ($\beta = 0.0004$; $p < 0.0000$). The obtained coefficient means that a higher level of GDP per capita is associated with a higher value of the CPI, i.e., with a lower level of corruption perception. At the same time, the indicators GDP growth ($\beta = -0.6075$; $p = 0.6955$), Inflation ($\beta = -0.4028$; $p = 0.2517$) and Government expenditure ($\beta = 0.3197$; $p = 0.2076$) did not demonstrate a statistically significant impact on the CPI at the 5% level. The positive relationship between GDP per capita and CPI can be explained by the fact that a higher level of economic development is usually accompanied by more developed institutions, higher quality of public administration, and greater resources to provide mechanisms for controlling and preventing corruption.

A number of standard tests were applied to check the quality of the models. Table 7 contains the results of key tests in the context of the obtained models. According to these results, it can be judged that the models for the Operational Activities and Results, Transparency and Public Communication groups have the highest correlation coefficients (R) and a sufficiently high explanatory power (R²).

Table 7. Results of statistical tests of regression models. Note: R – multiple correlation coefficient; R² – proportion of the variation in the dependent variable explained by the model; Adj. R² – adjusted R² taking into account the number of predictors; S (RMSE) – standard error of the model; F – F-statistic for testing the overall significance of the model; p-value – level of statistical significance of the model. (Source: calculated by the authors based on Transparency International (2026) and OECD Public Integrity Indicators (2026))

Group	R	R ²	S (RMSE)
Operational activities and results	0.591	0.349	14.661
Transparency and public communication	0.774	0.598	11.995
Regulatory support	0.570	0.325	14.863
Preventive mechanisms and integrity	0.284	0.080	17.346
Macroeconomic and financial indicators	0.840	0.706	9.793

The ANOVA test confirmed the statistical significance of the models (Table 8). This generally indicates a relationship between the effectiveness of anti-corruption bodies and the corruption rate. So, the model explains part of the variation in corruption levels among countries in the European region.

Table 8. Results of the ANOVA test to test the statistical significance of the regression model. (Source: calculated by the authors based on Transparency International (2026) and OECD Public Integrity Indicators (2026))

Group	df (regression)	SS (regression)	MS (regression)	F	p-value	SS (residual)	MS (residual)
Operational activities and results	4	3685.3760	921.3440	4.2866	0.0069	6877.8673	214.9334
Transparency and public communication	6	4927.9209	821.3202	5.7080	0.0009	3309.4457	143.8889
Regulatory support	5	2444.3445	488.8689	2.2129	0.0877	5081.1038	220.9176
Preventive mechanisms and integrity	5	604.8321	120.9664	0.4020	0.8423	6920.6161	300.8964
Macroeconomic and financial indicators	4	7 579.0042	1 894.7511	19.7590	0.0000	3 164.4695	95.8930

So, anti-corruption effectiveness is associated not only with the formal consolidation of regulatory norms, but, first of all, with the quality of their practical implementation through transparent reporting procedures and open dialogue. The models constructed for the Operational Activities and Results and Transparency and Public Communication groups are quite indicative for socio-economic research and demonstrate sufficient explanatory power. At the same time, as indicated by the statistically significant and strong direct effect of Intercept, there are other significant factors of influence that explain the level of corruption, causing its growth. For example, social and economic factors that potentially affect the growth of the corruption rate were not considered in the model. At the same time, explaining all the factors of corruption was not the goal of the model, as it was designed to assess the role of the effectiveness of persons investigating corruption offences in reducing the CPI.

DISCUSSION

Some earlier studies have already assessed the impact of various institutional indicators, in particular Human Capital Development, on the level of corruption. However, such indicators mainly characterize the general socio-economic or managerial potential of the country (Triatmanto & Bawono, 2023; Sarkar, 2024). Instead, the OECD PII used in this study reflect direct characteristics of the functioning of the public integrity system and internal anti-corruption compliance. Their use enables a more objective assessment of their relationship with corruption perception. The novelty of the study is the integration of public integrity indicators into the model for assessing the factors influencing the corruption rate. These indicators reflect the features of regulatory support, operational activities, transparency, and preventive mechanisms in the field of corruption prevention.

The results of the study emphasize the practical value of effective compliance mechanisms in ensuring transparency and trust. These results have something in common with the position of Nezhyva et al. (2024) and Dubynskyy et al. (2024), who emphasize that an effective compliance programme contributes to increasing trust, reputation, and building a culture of transparency. The results of Moreira & Soares (2023) and Moscariello et al. (2024) also showed that the effectiveness of compliance programmes is determined by the practical ability of individuals to ensure their implementation. Researchers noted that the evidence for the effectiveness of anti-corruption models is mixed, showing that compliance structures are often masking mechanisms. The researchers showed the need for a practical approach to understand what key attributes distinguish an effective compliance program from a formal/legal one. This is consistent with the results of Topchii et al.

(2022) and Kateryniuk (2022), who emphasized the problem of the declarativeness of legislative provisions and the need to implement effective mechanisms to combat corruption.

Yap et al. (2022) have shown that the audit mechanism and the code of conduct are the most important preventive measures in the fight against corruption, and negative incentives more often lead to corruption. The results of the analysis for 38 countries in the European region are partially consistent with these conclusions, but have a slightly different focus. It was found that formal regulatory support and individual preventive mechanisms do not have a direct statistically significant impact on the CPI. Instead, the key factor was the quality of the implementation of organizational structures and reporting, as well as transparency in the field of lobbying and public consultations. This indicates that the practical effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms in the studied countries is determined to a greater extent by the ability of authorized persons to ensure the real functioning of control institutions, rather than purely legal regulation.

Some scholars agree with the authors of this study on the importance of a comprehensive approach to combating corruption. Cherniei et al. (2022), using the example of Ukraine as a country with a fairly high level of corruption, emphasized the importance of implementing a systemic approach. Such an approach covers information and research, law-making, institutional control and supervision, law enforcement, and preventive and educational activities. Separately, the researchers emphasized the need to increase trust in the authorities, which is consistent with the author's results on the effectiveness of mechanisms for increasing transparency and open dialogue. Mahmud et al. (2022) also noted the appropriateness of implementing a comprehensive approach that combines internal strategies with exogenous legislation and restrictions. In general, the results of the scholars are consistent with the authors' previous conclusions that an effective fight against corruption requires not only legislative changes, but also proper institutional implementation.

Mugellini et al. (2021) found that whistleblower protection measures can be effective when combined with a high probability of audit. In the context of a sample of European countries where corruption rates vary significantly, the study found no evidence of the effectiveness of whistleblower protection as a separate factor influencing the CPI. This supports the author's conclusion that legal norms without effective institutional implementation do not reduce corruption. On the other hand, as Boufounou et al. (2024) show using the example of Greece, legislation can play a key role in combating corruption in developed countries. Differences in research results indicate the need for an individual approach to combating corruption, taking into account the level of development of the country, the peculiarities of its political and economic system, etc. This is supported by the findings of Ceschel et al. (2022), who noted that despite the potential importance of encouraging reporting on corruption, its effectiveness depends on the context and implementation. The authors emphasized the need to adapt strategies to local conditions and cultural specifics.

The analysis conducted in the paper showed a statistically significant impact of operational activities and transparency on the perception of corruption, which confirms the hypothesis of the study regarding the role of the functional efficiency of authorized persons. The analysis confirmed the validity of the results and supplements them with the conclusion that it is the ability of authorized persons to ensure real transparency and effective internal control that is crucial for effective compliance in the public sector. The practical use of these results is to provide an information basis for the formation of more effective anti-corruption programmes and initiatives.

The additional economic analysis is consistent with previous findings. The positive relationship between GDP per capita and CPI ($\beta = 0.0004$; $p < 0.0000$) supports the conclusion that higher economic development is associated with lower perceived corruption, consistent with Spyromitros and Panagiotidis (2022). It also complements findings on the negative effects of corruption on investment, financing, and public spending efficiency (Farinha & López-de-Foronda, 2024) and on employment growth under financial constraints (Amin & Soh, 2022).

The main limitations of the study: given that the analysis was based on averaged data for 2020-2025, the models may not take into account the time lag between the implementation of certain compliance mechanisms and their effect on the corruption perception. Another limitation is the use of the CPI, which has specific limitations for aggregated data, in particular, the subjectivity of the assessment.

CONCLUSIONS

The search for effective approaches to combating corruption is one of the key tasks for many governments, especially in developing countries. Along with this, legislative initiatives without proper institutional implementation do not have a significant impact on the corruption rate. This encourages the search for ways to strengthen the institutional and regulatory interaction between legal mechanisms and the practical activities of anti-corruption bodies.

The results obtained for the four models constructed in the study show that anti-corruption compliance has a fragmented and asymmetric impact on the CPI. In particular, the effect is mainly concentrated in narrow control mechanisms, while most instruments demonstrate a relatively weak or statistically insignificant relationship. Operational and preventive components did not show a stable positive impact, and the quality of reporting has an inverse relationship with the CPI. This state of affairs may indicate individual signs of formalization of procedures without their full transformation into effectiveness. The most effective mechanisms are those for limiting hidden influence ($\beta = 0.2923$) and disciplinary liability ($\beta = 0.4735$), while general transparency tools and regulatory measures are characterized by a less pronounced or unstable impact. In summary, it should be noted that the compliance system functions as a set of tools with different levels of effectiveness, among which the key role is played by the control of influences and liability. At the same time, other components are, rather, of an auxiliary nature.

The results of the study concluded that the transition to transparent reporting procedures and open dialogue is effective in increasing anti-corruption effectiveness. The additional analysis also showed a significant positive relationship between GDP per capita and CPI, indicating that a higher level of economic development is associated with lower perceived corruption. Such an approach will provide institutional and legal support to strengthen the impact of individuals' effectiveness in preventing corruption. Further research may expand the analysis by incorporating a broader range of economic and financial indicators to obtain a more comprehensive assessment of the factors influencing corruption perception.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

All authors have contributed equally.

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CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The Authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

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ФУНКЦІОНАЛЬНІ ХАРАКТЕРИСТИКИ ВНУТРІШНЬОГО АНТИКОРУПЦІЙНОГО КОМПЛАЄНСУ В ДЕРЖАВНОМУ СЕКТОРІ ТА ЇХНІЙ ВПЛИВ НА СПРИЙНЯТТЯ КОРУПЦІЇ

Метою цього дослідження було оцінити вплив індикаторів публічної доброчесності, які відображають ключові аспекти внутрішнього антикорупційного комплаєнсу, на рівень корупції в європейських країнах. Для виявлення статистично значущих взаємозв'язків між обраними індикаторами публічної доброчесності та сприйняттям корупції було застосовано методи регресійного аналізу та дисперсійного аналізу (ANOVA). Вибірка охоплювала 38 країн Європи та держав, асоційованих із європейським простором публічного врядування. Джерелами даних стали база даних OECD Public Integrity Indicators (PII) (2026) і Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) міжнародної організації Transparency International (2026). Крім того, було оцінено вплив окремих макроекономічних і фінансових показників на CPI із використанням даних Світового банку «Показники світового розвитку» (2026).

Результати показали, що в групі «Операційна діяльність та результати» найбільш статистично значущий вплив мав індикатор «Достатність структур впровадження та звітності» ($\beta = -0,3135$). У групі «Прозорість та публічна комунікація» статистично значущий вплив виявлено для індикаторів «Інклюзивність і прозорість міжінституційних та публічних консультацій» ($\beta = -0,2530$) і «Прозорість лобістської діяльності та запобігання неправомірному впливу» ($\beta = 0,2923$). У групі «Нормативне забезпечення» найсильніший вплив продемонстрував індикатор «Дисциплінарна система для державних службовців» ($\beta = 0,4735$). Додатковий аналіз показав, що ВВП на душу населення мав статистично значущий позитивний вплив на CPI ($\beta = 0,7257$; $p < 0,001$), водночас зростання ВВП, інфляція та державні витрати не продемонстрували статистично значущого окремого впливу.

Отримані результати свідчать, що формальні нормативно-правові вимоги без належного інституційного забезпечення їх реалізації не забезпечують очікуваного антикорупційного ефекту. Отже, ефективна протидія корупції потребує переходу від удосконалення законодавчих положень до посилення дієвих механізмів внутрішнього контролю та розвитку відкритого діалогу з громадськістю. Результати дослідження можуть бути використані для підвищення ефективності державних антикорупційних програм шляхом урахування виявлених інституційних чинників, що сприяють зниженню рівня корупції.

Ключові слова: антикорупційний комплаєнс, публічна доброчесність, індикатори публічної доброчесності ОЕСР (OECD Public Integrity Indicators), корупція, публічна комунікація, економічний розвиток, ВВП на душу населення, фінансові показники

JEL Класифікація: D73, H83, K42, M14